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David Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757)—which rep-
resents a major step towards clarifying eighteenth-century philos-
ophy’s dawning aesthetics in terms of taste—also relates closely 
to literal, physical taste. From the analogy between gustatory and 
critical taste, Hume, apt at judging works of art, puts together a con-
tradictory argument of subjectivism (taste is individual and varies 
from person to person) and the normativity of common sense (the 
test of time shows that some works of art are better than others). 
However, a careful reading of the text unveils a way of appealing to 
art criticism as a vital component in edifying a philosophically more 
solid standard of taste. Hume’s emphatic references to a requisite 
“delicacy” complicate the picture, for it is not clear what this delicacy 
is, but a close inspection of how Hume frames the criterion of deli-
cacy by means of “practice” and the absence of “prejudice” might 
perhaps challenge us to address issues of contemporary art.
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David Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste”, originally pub-
lished in 1757, stands out when it comes to reconsidering aesthet-
ics through the classical category of taste, and this position is not 
only due to the obvious appropriateness of the essay’s title. Carolyn 
Korsmeyer rightly notes that Hume: “takes the analogy between lit-
eral taste and a higher aesthetic taste more seriously than those who 
follow him.”1 Indeed, Hume’s text has become an irrefutable to-
pos of eighteenth-century philosophical use of taste, and its famous 
opening sentence—faithful to Hume’s vigorous and elegant prose—
perfectly suits his empiricist approach to philosophy: “The great 
variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, which prevails in the world, 
is too obvious not to have fallen under every one’s observation.”2
How often has this opening clause and subsequent ones, where 
Hume travels through entire civilizations, ages and classes, not been 
cited as an eloquent example of Hume’s scepticism and stubborn 
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refusal to deduce from observable facts to conceptual categories? 
Yet, in an attentive perusal of the entire essay, the text appears to 
stray into not only complex argumentation but also to provide evi-
dence of the conceptual potential of taste. This is the reason why I 
shall propose a more myopic, literal reading of the text that focus-
es on—and almost tastes—some of the high-profile words that take 
Hume’s inquiry of a standard of taste into surprising dimensions of 
aesthetic theory. In that sense, the methodological grasp of this pa-
per proceeds more by a kind of deliberate ‘decontextualizing’ than 
it is based on the contextualizing lines that most often guide the 
study of the British eighteenth-century moralists. If Hume largely 
joins Shaftesbury and Burke in making aesthetic morality ideolog-
ically effective, as well as the British thinkers are more concerned 
with manners, customs, and habits of human nature than with art,3 
Hume actually seems to involve art substantially when he is ad-
dressing the question of taste.
Of course, focusing on an individual essay written late in 
Hume’s career may also misrepresent the degree to which his aes-
thetic theory is integrated into his philosophical system, but such 
an objection—once again—manifests a tendency to take for grant-
ed that radical scepticism is primary in aesthetics, as elsewhere 
in Hume, and thus to lock the text in place as a historic document 
representing a traditional philosophical position. I would like to 
risk the exact opposite. While re-reading this energetic and unde-
niably complex text it struck me that, beyond empiricism or any 
common sense perspective of taste, beyond later Kantian transfor-
mation as well, Hume makes art criticism an important aspect of 
his argument. Art criticism appears as a vital component in his way 
of edifying an unexpectedly, philosophically more solid standard 
of taste and, even more intriguing, in doing so Hume intensively 
relates taste to the world of art, to works of art and, more implic-
itly, to the very making of art. “Delicacy” was the ambiguous term 
that made me suspect that the text had an undercurrent of aesthet-
ic intuitions that may perhaps lead all the way to contemporary art, 
which chronically lacks—so the saying goes—any standard of taste. 
PRAGMATICS OF COMMON SENSE
Let us return to the legendary, ingenious introduction in Hume’s 
essay. This stupendous opening confines the search for a stand-
ard of taste as stretching between two proverbial truths, both of 
which nip that same search in the bud. On the one hand, Hume be-
gins by positing that taste varies from one person to another, from 
one culture to another, and from one civilization to another, only 
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to conclude with the well-known proverb that there can be no ac-
counting for tastes, stating: “the proverb has justly determined it 
to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes” (137). In other words, 
it is useless to try to agree about something that depends on pure 
individual inclinations. Relativism with regard to taste poses an 
insurmountable obstacle. Unlike understanding—whose “determi-
nations have reference to something beyond themselves,” and ac-
cordingly can be judged conformable, or not, to a standard: “all 
sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing 
beyond itself” (136). Closely connecting taste to feelings inevitably 
leads to banning any attempt to decide what good taste is and what 
bad taste is. When judgments of taste conflict, everyone must insist 
on his or her own sensibility. How culturally rooted taste may be, it 
is produced individually and inseparable from one’s emotional fin-
gerprint. A sentiment either is or it is not; it has no other criterion 
than itself. Sensibility, accordingly, seems at once the surest foun-
dation of taste and no foundation at all. 
On the other hand, Hume prepares for a reversal of gustato-
ry relativism, actually throughout the whole essay. The redundant 
use of “but though” is nothing but a linguistic marker of his attempt 
to go beyond relativism, for example: “But though this axiom, by 
passing into a proverb, seems to have attained the sanction of com-
mon sense; there is certainty of a species of common sense, which 
opposes it, at least serves to modify and restrain it” (137). What ex-
actly is Hume pointing to? Does he intend to replace one common 
sense with another? Or if not opposing, then modifying and re-
straining the relativist lack of a standard of taste? What happens 
to be this other common sense comparable to the shared proverbi-
al wisdom? It is simply, claims Hume, a fact that some judgments of 
taste are obviously better than others. Yet, in arguing for this com-
mon sense, which is as irrefutable as the other one, Hume seems 
to leave the point of view of the tasting subject behind him and, all 
the same, the strength of truth inherent to individual sentiments 
that made consensus impossible. In return, he enters the world of 
art by referring to works of art and the artists that produce them. 
This argument is however in the first place framed as convention-
ally as the other one. The existence of canonical, classical works 
proves that some are better than others and, consequently, should 
be met by the admiration of all mankind: “Whoever would assert 
an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton […] 
would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had 
maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Tenerife, or a pond as ex-
tensive as the ocean” (137).
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The common sense at stake in a unanimity of appreciation 
achieved through reference to masterful works like Milton’s points 
to what we, in a modern philosophical vocabulary, could translate 
as a culturally intersubjective pragmatic process of selection by 
means of which experts, art critics, art amateurs and ordinary peo-
ple end up joining sharing each other’s tastes. The true works of 
art impose their authority over time, through the ages. Taste, then, 
ultimately, relates to, responds to or reflects negotiated conven-
tions within a specific cultural context. If the argument of taste’s in-
separability to spontaneous individual feelings was based upon an 
empiricist a priori of no return, this other claim concerning the can-
onization of undoubtedly outstanding artworks points to a posteri-
ori proceedings by means of which works of art pass the test of time. 
However, instead of accepting an obliteration of taste, be it 
downwards by sticking to strictly idiosyncratic standards, or up-
wards by establishing authoritative standards, Hume is eager 
to search for a truer, more proper standard of taste, i.e. the “op-
erations of true taste” (147). It seems as if at least the collective 
standard of taste builds upon a normative basis that leans on a tru-
er sentiment—perhaps a refined one—but nevertheless a sentiment 
otherwise capable of claiming its truth. In arguing so, art criticism 
comes into play.
DELICACY OF TASTE
At the turning point where the two standards of taste, so to speak, 
collapse into common sense, Hume actually carries on by drawing 
a portrait of art critics. The most distinguished of the kind demon-
strate a taste that satisfies a considerable number of the condi-
tions that might enable them to “establish their own sentiment as 
the standard of beauty” (147). In this promotion of fine arbiters of 
taste, delicacy functions as a major term—one of four key notions 
Hume italicizes—in that it assumes the various claims to a nec-
essary refinement of the organ of taste, from its most literal em-
beddedness in bodily perception, to more intellectual capacities 
of imagination and understanding, if a standard of taste should 
be able to overcome the natural variety and ordinary caprice of 
taste. It takes a “sound” organ, just as it takes a “delicacy of im-
agination” to obtain a “true standard of taste and sentiment” (140), 
Hume argues. 
Delicacy certainly claims Hume’s full attention and he strongly 
points out the need to provide a more “accurate definition of deli-
cacy”. For that purpose, he relates an anecdote from Don Quixote 
about how at a wine testing, two kinsmen were able to detect subtle 
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flavours, the one a slight taste of iron and the other a faint taste of 
leather, even though neither of them knew that a key on a leathern 
chain was hidden at the bottom of the wine cask. But, once revealed, 
it of course gave proof to their judgment. Hume makes use of this 
story to give a more explicit definition of the meaning of delicacy: 
“Where the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, 
and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in 
the composition, this we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ 
these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense” (141).
Still, this firm definition may be more ambiguous than it seems. 
Delicacy, understood as the ability to perceive the subtlest ingredi-
ents in what composes an object of taste, almost presupposes the 
existence of objective criteria, as if Hume were tempted to follow 
Baumgarten, who declared aesthetics to be “the science of sensual 
cognition.”4 But Hume uses the narrative less rigorously, with the 
anecdote quite simply serving to instead invoke the kind of atten-
tion that should be cultivated in order to gain delicacy, i.e. an abili-
ty to keep one’s eyes and ears open, to let one’s glance dwell on the 
object of taste while experiencing it with sagacity, refining one’s 
tastes, proving that taste is a credible guide. Even so, if Hume does 
not subscribe to German rationalism in descending from the uni-
versal to the particular, he also deviates from his British colleagues 
that largely connected delicacy to aestheticized morality, praising 
a delightful fulfilment of nature in men of good manners. 
Two other terms, also italicized by Hume, back up the claim 
of a much more practical approach to delicacy, when he strong-
ly insists on the necessity of practice and the absence of prejudice, 
since both contribute to solidifying the understanding of a delicacy 
of taste beyond the idea of sensible cognition. In this perspective, 
practical experience is what matters, as far as practice permits the 
critic to increase his talent, notably by making comparisons (also 
italicized by Hume) that allow him to form a clear and distinct sen-
timent concerning those objects that an unpractized person would 
be unable to perceive: “A man who has had no opportunity of com-
paring the different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified 
to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to 
him” (144).
Likewise, the critic should be free from all prejudice in order 
to embrace the point of view of the work he is judging. Hume ar-
gues, by analogy, to use of reason because prejudices are general-
ly devastating to the faculty of judgment: “It is well known, that, 
in all questions submitted to the understanding, prejudice is de-
structive of sound judgment, and perverts all operations of the 
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intellectual faculties: it is no less contrary to good taste” (146). 
Though Hume concedes that critics uniting these qualities of deli-
cacy, practice and impartiality are extremely few in number—even 
“during the most polished ages”—he concludes that there is a stand-
ard of taste that is shaped upon the features that might distinguish 
“so rare a character” as to be a “true judge in the finer art,” stating 
that a “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment improved by prac-
tice, perfected by comparison, and cleared from all prejudice, can 
alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict 
of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste 
and beauty” (147).
But while Hume goes on by asking where to actually find such 
critics, and in fact returns to consider natural variations within 
these rare men of delicate taste (young people often prefer differ-
ent types of art than their elders), it is worthwhile to go further and 
scrutinize his argumentation concerning delicacy and its auxiliary 
terms of practice and the like. Again, Hume demonstrates amaz-
ing complexity. On the one hand, delicacy of taste is, in general 
and conventional terms, put down to a vague reference to human 
nature: “because it is the source of all the finest and most innocent 
enjoyments of which human nature is susceptible”—upon which he 
also states: “the sentiments of all mankind are agreed” (143); but, 
simultaneously, in the margins of the text, it also becomes clear 
that the criterion of delicacy more profoundly and more substan-
tially connects to works of art. Delicacy is somehow sharpened by 
works of art, not only when we experience them but when we learn 
from them. After all, works of art themselves, considered from in-
side out, so to speak, might ultimately shed light on how to con-
clude from delicacy “a true standard of taste” (140). 
Surreptitiously, the perspective is no longer that of critics tast-
ing art with delicacy, but has been transposed into a question of ar-
tistic creation. Works of art testify to the rules upon which they 
should be judged, and these rules are strictly rules of art. Hume 
is perfectly clear on this point, for example, with regard to poet-
ry: “But though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be 
confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by geni-
us or observation” (138). This remark marks may be a hidden, but 
also an important turn in the essay, in that Hume almost insensi-
bly, and without any further mediation, adopts the position of the 
artist, and more precisely the artist at work. The author feels com-
pelled to discover the rules of his art while writing, whether po-
ets are guided by inspiration or by making their own observations. 
What matters is that the implicit “true standard of taste” points to a 
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truth that originates from the work of art and its previous process 
of having become a work of art. Art truly needs rules, but not as in-
structions to adhere to. Rules appear in the process of creating the 
artwork, not prior to it. In emphasizing the rule of no rules, Hume 
moves intuitively close to Kant’s edifying negative transcendental 
formulation of the lawfulness without law at play in the aesthetic 
judgment, but he does so basically when speaking of art and art-
ists, approaching even more substantially the Kantian understand-
ing of genius, because, in Kant too, genius is the gift of the artist to 
create that for which no rule can be given; rather, as Kant explicitly 
states: “the rule must be abstracted from what the artist has done.”5 
We might then say that Hume situates the standard of taste in a kind 
of blindness, on the blind edge of artists’ experiences, for instance 
when a poet or a painter has to make decisions about what is next 
in the execution of a poem or a painting.    
The teasing question about rules, the artists’ own rules inherent 
to the making of their art, should not go passed unnoticed, because 
it causes a redistribution of the relationships Hume establishes be-
tween taste, delicacy and art criticism. If artists suddenly have a 
lead on critics, the standard of taste being somehow associated 
with artistic production at the most concrete level of execution, this 
signifies that art criticism should be engaged at the same altitudes. 
Finally, works of art require art critics who are capable of meeting 
them at the very level of the “performances” achieved by the art-
ists. This was also Hume’s reason for fighting against prejudices as 
the critic should be sensible “to that what is required by the perfor-
mance” (145). It is extraordinary to encounter, under the plume of 
Hume, the word “performance” as synonymous to a work of art. It 
actually means that Hume wants to place the point of view of the 
critic as near as possible to the point of view that the work assumes: 
“placing himself in that point of view which the performance sup-
poses” (145). Incidentally, “performance” also matches the criteri-
on of practice that Hume meticulously paid attention to. It is worth 
noting that when discussing the right attitude of the critic towards 
“the merits of every performance”, Hume essentially draws on the 
practice of the artist as the inner mirror of what should be the prac-
tice of the art critic as well: “the same address and dexterity, which 
practice gives to the execution of any work, is also acquired by the 
same means in the judging of it” (144). 
It becomes clear that the key notions of delicacy and practice 
run in two different directions, in reality as much towards the artist 
and the process of making art as towards the critic and the process 
of judging art; or better: the practice required by the critic in order 
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to improve the requisite delicacy that must be informed by the prac-
tice and the various ways of execution and practical choices that 
support a work of art. At this point, Hume’s search for a standard of 
taste embraces the standard that art itself establishes. Of course, in 
this seminal text on orienting taste towards aesthetic issues, the im-
pulses and orientations are heterogeneous, fluctuating, indecisive; 
but in pursuing the specific perspective of delicacy and the need for 
delicacy in tasting art properly and truly, Hume associates a stand-
ard of taste to what has to be extracted, inside out, from the artist’s 
own struggle to create a work of art. Taste consequently comes 
across as a workspace, implying rationality, as far as the artist is 
not guided by divine inspiration alone, but has to invest both prac-
tical and rational skills once determined to produce a work of art. 
EPILOGUE ON CONTEMPORARY ART
Reopening the argument assumed by delicacy ultimately leads 
to how Hume destabilizes any standard of taste based on norma-
tivity or common sense, yet simultaneously reconstructs a stand-
ard of taste in a rather distorted way by drawing direct attention to 
the artistic process. And thereby taste points to something a little 
more conceptually dignified than pure subjective feelings. At least 
we can say that, with Hume, art criticism astonishingly becomes 
part of aesthetic theorization before it disappears into Kant’s epis-
temological favoring of natural beauty. In this regard, it is worth 
remembering that French philosopher Denis Diderot, during the 
same period, was about to launch the adventure of art criticism 
by embarking on Salons, which ended up becoming one of his 
most compelling works and covered more than twenty years of the 
French Academy’s biennial exhibitions in the Louvre. In Salon of 
1765, which represents one of the pinnacles of Diderot’s enthusi-
asm as an art critic, Diderot explicitly recognizes that it is the very 
task of conducting art criticism that encouraged, if not urged, him 
to develop and practice a more sensitive approach to the works of 
art he was writing about than the “superficial gaze of the crowd,”6 
which had also characterized his own experience of the Salons pri-
or to becoming an art critic. Art criticism taught him the necessi-
ty of a bodily embedded perception—“to fixe my eyes at the canvas” 
and “to go around the marble”7—in order to be more impartial, and 
just, in his judgments of taste. 
With Diderot, a certain amount of sensibilization involving 
concrete and bodily perception is inherent to art criticism, prob-
ably a constitutive one, not only because the critic should “feel” 
the work, but more fundamentally as far as the critic endeavors to 
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engage in the difficult task of converging with the ambitions of the 
artist to create beauty, or simply create art. This ambition was per-
haps an additional reason why Diderot was remarkably eager to 
expand his knowledge about painting techniques and subjects re-
lated to the “faire” (the making) of painting. Again, as with Hume’s 
delicacy, aesthetic rationality points less to standards of taste ob-
tained by conventions than to proper artistic challenges originat-
ing from the artworks themselves, and accordingly judgments have 
to be pronounced on that lane. Of course, Diderot, as a child of 
his time, remained widely loyal to classicism, somehow stuck to 
the “grand style” based on the hierarchy of genres and thus cer-
tainly incapable of transgressing the conventions that made up the 
standard of that time, but his experience of art criticism neverthe-
less dynamically meets art head-on when art demands its own due. 
Strikingly Diderot also invites philosophical modesty when he is 
not only sincerely, but also visibly, grateful towards German phi-
losopher Grimm, who commissioned the reviews, and confesses 
that the “few thoughtful notions about painting and sculpture”8 he 
had come to cherish owed their philosophical credit, in reality, to 
his experience as an art critic.
This can be said to be even truer about our time. The emancipa-
tion of contemporary art from all traditional criteria has opened up 
a field of limitless possibilities and total freedom, which, according 
to Arthur Danto, has led to the negation of art in that “the history of 
art has come to an end.”9 Actually, ever since art’s post-Duchampi-
an power of self-definition, many theorists define art without ref-
erence to any notion of quality, or invoke, with reference to George 
Dickie, in accordance with Danto, structures of art institutions as 
the only “necessary and sufficient conditions” which are left to de-
fine (or properly dictate) what art is and what it is not.10 But, rather 
than paying witness to the end of the history of art or to the institu-
tional art world, contemporary art testifies to the loss of any mod-
el, to the extent that criticism finds itself obliged to examine each 
work on its own merits—not to mention that the so-called experts 
and the artists themselves inhabit that same art world. This leads 
us back to Hume where we left him.
For every era, appreciating a work of art clearly requires famil-
iarity with various historical conditions for artistic creation. Not 
everything is possible at every time. Aesthetic delicacy includes 
knowledge about what can be art—or what art can be—in relation 
to its recent past and the possibilities that it holds. No aesthetic 
delicacy or refined affinity (or complicity) with artists would have 
enabled Hume, or Diderot, to defend the artistic pretention of a 
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readymade or a monochrome, while a canvas painted today in a 
classical fashion would scarcely correspond to what is generally 
considered a current preoccupation of art. Also, if it is relatively 
easy to measure the impact of a work retrospectively by its influ-
ence on successors or the artist’s lifework, this is not the case when 
a momentous legacy has not been established. Contemporary art 
is chronically exposed to these circumstances, especially when 
caught, as it seems to be, in a spiral of radicalization that charac-
terizes avant-gardist expectations, with no rebound in sight.  
Still, the quality of particular works of art, as well as the aes-
thetic experience they give access to, remain a principal concern 
of art criticism and aesthetic reflection in general, with the entire 
issue resting on knowing how to account for taste, for what one 
likes or dislikes without applying standards of taste independent-
ly of the artworks involved, but certainly also without accepting 
that anything goes. New standards of taste arise, spelling out new 
criteria more pertinent to the contemporary social context; some-
times it happens immediately, sometimes after years of delay. 
The hardly disguised contempt that German and American Neo-
Expressionism partially encountered when artists such as Baselitz, 
Penck, Immendorf, and Kiefer appeared on the international art 
scene during the late nineteen-sixties and nineteen-eighties might 
serve as an illustrative example. Many established art circles reject-
ed, for instance, Kiefer’s gigantic melancholic works because of 
a “return to painting” that was associated with an aesthetic regres-
sion of Neo-Expressionism and political and moral regression.11 
Apparently, Kiefer did not deliver what had become the standard of 
taste as related to an avant-garde logic of rupture. In 2015 the Centre 
Pompidou in France had a compelling retrospective exhibition of 
more than 150 of Kiefer’s works, implying that a half a century had 
had to pass for the “new language” that Kiefer had developed in his 
controversial works to be deciphered on a common scale. The lan-
guage, artistically symbolic, was described in the exhibition leaf-
let as: “both poetic and cathartic, steeped in German culture, in 
universal history, in mysticism and philosophy.”12 Again, we may 
join Hume in connecting the perspective of taste to the delicacy of 
art criticism. It surprisingly turns out that taste, essentially unme-
diated as pure sentiment, is illuminated by entire intellectual spac-
es permeated by theoretical reasons. Or put differently: If beauty 
or cultural value in Kiefer, or any other artist, is not an objective 
property of things, the critic cannot neutrally describe a work of art, 
ignoring its claim to aesthetic value, which essentially implies ar-
tistic processes of symbolization. The only workable description 
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is one that grasps the artwork in light of its own artistic ambitions, 
and which therefore seeks to identify the nature of its coherence 
and intensity, its scope—what precisely is at stake in it—and its con-
temporary relevance for aesthetic experience. Without categories 
of this order, an object, a text, an image or a piece of music cannot 
be “tasted” as an aesthetic object or a work of art.
Certainly, critics of art, as well as aesthetic theorists, will have 
to play a more modest role and no longer claim, together with the 
Romantics, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, to challenge Western ration-
alism in the name of art, nor limit the scope of art to a politicizing 
interpretation of avant-garde art (and if not delivered, proclaim-
ing the end of art). But, delicate critics in Hume’s sense are need-
ed at the very core of aesthetic theorization in order to contribute 
to a discussion of the issues presented by the most eloquent, in-
teresting works, especially if they succeed in carrying out—in line 
with Jacques Rancière’s approach to aesthetics—new ways of see-
ing, heightening critical awareness or, quite simply, increasing 
sensitivity about society in general.13 Of course, as constitutive-
ly with taste, this conviction runs into a barrier because taste origi-
nates in the flesh, but this obstacle should not discourage aesthetic 
reflection from attempting to explore the underlying reasons of 
taste preferences and dislikes. Especially in light of the terror of 
the “purely subjective,” it is urgent to unfold and identify how art-
ists more or less convincingly succeed in coming across issues of 
concern by formal embodiment. The notion of “beautiful” makes 
no sense “only for me,”14 but engages concerns about addition-
al shared cultural likes and dislikes that divide society. This idea 
of sharing that is inherent to “beautiful” (how misleading this out-
dated attribute might be in aesthetics) when applied to a success-
ful work of art is exactly what still escapes positivist and empiricist 
approaches to aesthetic judgment. That is why Hume ultimately 
connects with Kant, as well as his essay on taste might be rehabili-
tated as an invitation to open up the Kantian deduction of the aes-
thetic judgment towards works of art and their silent knowledge 
about their coming into being as art.
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